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Those two masters of contract many of you thougl~t I was trylng to say general commoi-~ law doctrlne that no 
interpretation, Arthur Corbin and Carlton all along, namely, how should an contract 1n contravenuon of law or publlc ~ 
Snow, know that context 1s nearly arbltratol go about "readmg," or pollcy w11 be enforced But i t  cautioned 
everything in extracting meanlng from a mterpretlng, a contract  hat "a court's refusal to enforce an 
set of words When I spoke of the arbltlatol's uzterpletatlo~z ol [labor] 
"contract reader" years ago, ~t was m the contracts is llmlted to sltuatlons where thi 
context of a paper deallng wtl1 judicial Dl contract as Interpreted would vlola~e remew of an arbitrator's award The 'some expliclt publlc pollcy' that 1s 'well 
process of contract interpretation as such deflned and dominant, and is to be 
was not my concern I had a simple, but I ascertained by rcfelence to the laws and 
like to thmk lnlpoitant point to make Judicial review legal precedents and not lrom general 
When a court has before ~t an arbitrator's 
Of arbitratioll awards con.s~deratlons of supposed publlc award appljmg a collective bargaining interests "' 
agreement, ~t is just as if the employer and The stor7i begins, of course, wth Uavld Many lower courts have stlll not got 
the union had slgned a stlpulatlon stating Fellers gleat the Steehorkers the message Judges have been so 
"What the arbitrator says thls contract Trllogy (Steelwol hers v Ainencan offended by the reinstatement of devlant 
means 1s exactly what we meant it to say ManL~nchi,-ulg C o ,  363 564 [1960], postal workers, sexual harassers, and 
That Is what we intended 
agreeing the Steelworhel s v \,al ilol Nav Co , alcoholic alrline pllots that they have 
award be and binding ' "  In 363 U S 574 [196()], and Steelworkevs v disregarded the dnectives of Entevpnse 
this sense, an "erroneous interpretation" of E,lte,pnse meel Coq3 , 363 and Mlsco Unfortunately and 
the contract by the arbitrator is a 593 119601) There, the Supreme Coult the Supreme has 
contradiction in terms made arbitration the llnchpln m the not seen fit to step in and lnslst that ~ t s  
Now, my Law federal scheme for the lmplementatlon of dlctates be followed Thus, the First and 
Kamisar, who has had of hls books collective bargalnlng agreements More Flfth Clrcults have taken lt upon 
and artlcles clted by the U S Supreme specifically, for our purposes, the Court in themselves to find an award at odds wth 
Court than any other contemporary one of the three cases, Enteiynse Wheel ,  their notlons of publlc pohcy, even 
scholar, xlvlses us legal scribblers that It tlghr constraints on ludlclal though the actlon ordered, such as a 
enough have a sound idea "To remew of arbltral awards So long as the remstatement, would noL have vlolated 
make a lastlng ~mpresslon," says Yale, award is not the product of fraud or any posltlve law or established public 
"you must couch your ldeas m memolable corrupLlon, does nor exceed pollcy ~f i t  had been taken by the 
I 
I 
language " "1 way back ln tried arbitrator's authority under the parties' employer on ~ t s  own lnltlatlve The 
my best come up mth a catchy phrase subm~ssion, and "draws ~ t s  essence" from Fourth, Surth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and 
to convey my notion about the the labor contract, a court 1s to enforce D C Clrcults have been far more falthful 
relationship between arbitrators and the the award without any attelnpt Lo -remew to the M ~ s c o  mandate The Second, Thiid, 
contracts they are asked to interpret the merits " Despite these stllctures, the Eighth, and Eleventh Clrcults have 
What could be more apt than to get a vacillated on the issue, but the m o s ~  
I 
itch of the judlclary to right seernlng 
think of the arbitrator as wrongs has compelled the Court to revlslt recent decisions seem more m llne 1 
pickmg up the partles' agreement and the subject, most notably ln Pape~wol  hers w t h  MISCO 
"reading it off' as easlly and v Mlsco Inc , 484 U S 29 (1987) Because 1 consldel it one of the easler 
stralghtforwaldly as A-B-C? Yale dldn't tell Mrsco presented pollcy issues in arbitration, however much 
us, however, that sometimes you can questlon 111 dramatlc fashlon The Flfth mlsunderstoOd "y a number of 
succeed too well The audience may Clrcult had iefused to enfolce an shall deal brusquely wlth the rejection ol 1 
remember your catchy phrase - and arbitrator's relnsta~ement of an employee othelwse legitimate awards on the basls 
entirely forget your polntl whose job was operating a dangerous of a nebulous public policy That usually I 
Today I am golng to take two quite paper-cu~ting machme, and whose car had colnes down LO the highly subjective 
different tacks First, I the been found to contam marijuana whlle ~n feellngs of particular judges For me, ~hree 
theas I thought 1 was communlcatlng to ihe company palhng lot ~h~ supreme estimable crltlcs have correctly assessed 
You 25 Yea'' 'go The Court reversed, declaring that "as long as the problem and arrlved at  he nght 
w l l  lie on what may be the hottest issue ,he arbsrator even arguably construing ~ 0 1 ~ t i o n  I  VarloUS formulations, Judge 
m judlclal revlew, namely, when may a or applylng the conlract and actlng wlthin Frank Eastelbrook and Professors ~halles 
court set aside an arbaral award on the the scope of his authollty a courL k ~ e r  lhmd Feller have concluded 
grounds It violates 1'ub1lc pollcy Second, colmnced he comlnltted serlous error that ~f the employer (or the elnployer 113 
in response to your overwhellnlng does not suffice to overtulll 111s decision " conjunction w t h  ~ l ~ e  unlon) has  he 
demand, I'd llke to talk a little about what The Court llaturally lecognlzed the lawful authollty to lake unilaterally the 
action directed by the arbitrator, such as 
reinstatement of a wrongdoing employee, 
the arbitral award should be upheld 
against public policy claims. If the airline 
would not have violated the regulations of 
the Federal Aviation Administration by 
putting the rehabilitated, re-licensed 
alcoholic pilot back in the cockpit, the 
arbitrator's award to that effect is valid and 
enforceable. 
That approach is entirely in keeping 
with the underlying notion that the 
arbitrator is the parties' surrogate, their 
designated spokesperson in reading and 
applylng the contract. What the parties 
are entitled to say or do on their own, the 
arbitrator is entitled to say or order. That 
simple principle seems so self-evident, 
and so implicit in the Supreme Court's 
rulings to date, that it should become the 
accepted norm in the future. This would 
merely confirm arbitration as the "final 
and binding" dispute resolution procedure 
that the parties' contracts almost 
invariably denominate it. 
We may shortly have further 
enlightenment from the Supreme Court 
on this long-running debate. In March 
2000 certiorari was granted in Eastern 
Associated Coal Corp. v. Mine Workers. This 
was another instance of marijuana 
ingestion by a worker in a hazardous 
occupation, here, a mobile equipment 
operator. In sustaining the arbitrator's 
reinstatement, the lower courts 
acknowledged that Department of 
Transportation (DOT) regulations 
expressed a "well defined and dominant 
public policy" against drug use by "those 
in safety-sensitive positions." But the court 
of appeals went on to say: "[Tlhere is no 
such policy against the reinstatement of 
employees who have used illegal drugs in 
the past." 
In short, the key is whether the 
remedial action ordered by the arbitrator, 
not the triggering conduct of the 
employee, is contrary to public policy Of 
course, the drug-taking employee acted 
contrary to public policy But the award- 
Issuing arbitrator did not and his decision 
should stand. Indeed, recognizing the 
Possibility of the rehabilitation of 
wrongdoers is a hallmark of a humane 
and caring society. Despite the ominous 
implications of a grant of certiol-nli when 
the court of appeals did not even deign to 
publish its opiizion, that is the way the 
Supreme Court should rule in this case. 
In addition to overturning awards on 
public policy grounds, judges will not 
uphold an arbitrator's decision if it 
stretches beyond some line of rationality 
Courts that proclaim their alle,' oiance to 
the Elltelylise and Misco principles will 
balk ai enforcing an award they find has 
"no rational basis" because, for example, 
il ignores the "plain meaning" of the 
contract. Regrettably, I cannot say that 
vacating an arbitral award on grounds of 
irrationality is contrary to the contract 
reader thesis. In the parties' final and 
binding arbitration agreement, they 
presumably took it for granted not only 
that arbitrators would be untainted by 
1 fraud or corruption, but also that they 
would not be insane and their decisions 
not totally without reason. In any event, 
it is probably impossible to keep courts 
from inrervening, on one theory or 
another, when an arbitration award is 
deemed so distorted as to reflect utter 
irrationality, if not temporary insanity 
One can only hope that the careful, artful 
crafting of arbitral opinions will keep this 
judicial exception to the finality doctrine 
to the barest minimum. 
' Contract " ' reahg"  
as contract 
interpretation 
From what I have said, judges should 
have an easy time enforcing most arbitral 
awards. Instead, they make ii hard on 
themselves. If they would jusl take our 
word for what a contract means, they 
would have far fewer problems. We are 
the ones with the tough job. How should 
arbitrators go about divining the parties' 
"intent" when the reality is they never 
contemplated the particular issue that has 
now arisen? What do we do when a "plain 
meaning" conflicts with bargaining history 
or established practice? 
Tvvo splendid articles by our colleagues 
Carlton Snow and Rchard Mittenthal- 
do I dare apply that over-used term 
"defirntive" to them? - have sald nearlv 
all that needs to be said about plain 
meaning and past practice. Carlton is, for 
him, uncharacteristically blunt: 
"Arbitrators' continued invocation of the 
plain meaning rule is anomalous in light 
of the trend to reject the rule by the 
courts, the U.C.C. [Uniform Commercial 
Code], the Restatement [of Contracts], 
and Lreatise writers " Dick was prepared to 
declare, almos~ 40 years ago, that past 
practice "may be used to clarify what is 
ambiguous, to gve substance to what is 
general, and perhaps even to modify or 
amend what is seemingly unambiguous." 
The rest of my remarks will mostly be 
embroidery upon the lessons of these 
masters. 
Despite the teachings of Snow and 
~ i t t en iha l ,  numerous arbitrators of high 
repute have accepted or at least paid lip 
service to the plain meaning lule and its 
benighted first cousin, the par01 evidence 
rule. In most cases this may cause little 
harm, at least as to the resuh After all, we 
properly begm our mterpretatlon of a 
collectir7e bargamlng agleement wiih the 
language of the contraci, and often we can 
end there But one of the great modern 
slate supreme court justices, Roger 
~ra~nol 'of  Califorma, put his finger on 
the problem when he said: 
"A rule that would limit the 
determination of the meaning of a written 
instrument to its four-corners merely 
because it seems to the couri to be clear 
and unambiguous, would either deny the 
relevance of the intention of the parties or 
presuppose a degree of verbal precision 
and stability our language has not 
attained." 
Put differently, if fidelity to the parties' 
intent (or their putative intent about a 
ewdence reasonably probatlve of that 
intent cannot be justified In collective 
bargammg, what I would call "contex~uai 
interpletation" 1s llkely LO be grounded In 
evldel~ce concernnlg negotlatlng h1stol-y 
and past piactlcc 
In recent decisions, albl~rators lzave 
frequently been prepared to look behlnd 
what might appear the plam meaning of 
 he wrltten lnstrumeilt to dlsceln Intent 
from barga~nlng hrstory and other pal01 
evldence Ol coulse, arbiilalors son~stlinej 
play ~t safe by imdlng an amblgulty m tlze 
language as wntten, wlzlch males the11 
lesort to extrlnslc evldence qulte 
conventional But thc arbitrators' 
ambiguity 1s often the parcles' clear and 
unamblguous promsion, susialning ihe 
lalters' respectlve opposlng posltlons 
Logically, there seems no reason not LO 
take a final step If the partles, for reasons 
sufficient unto themselves - for example 
concealing trade secrets fiom an 
employer's competitors - decided to 
cloak certam plovlslons of the collective 
agreement 111 a pnvate code, an arbltrator 
should entertam ewdence to that effect, 
however clear and unamblguous the 
language mlgllt othenvlse appear 
Professor Corbm 1s m accord Needlcss to 
say, m any case where one party alleges 
and the other denies the use of such a 
prlvate code, the arbltrator 1s golng to be 
skeptical that ordinary Engllsh has been 
thus stood on ~ t s  head, and demand petty 
conwnclng ploof of the clalm 
That brlngs us to conslder the most 
pracilcal argument In favol of ilze plan 
meanlng lule - the time and cost of 
trylng to prove that what seems on 11s face 
clear and unamblguous 1s not Yet hele, as 
m so many othel mstances, I belleve il~e 
solution has to be lhe sound dlscrelloil of 
the aibltrator I would noi reject oul of 
hand a11 offei to prove that tlze appare1ltly 
clear and unamblguous was m fact 
Intended to mean someihlng toially 
different But I would rcfuse p~olfereci 
ewdence that merely reflected onc parly's 
mternal, uncornmunlcaled unders~ancllngj 
of coniract telnls, and I would glve short 
shrlft to testnnony 01 exhlbits thai werc 
problem they niver anticipated) 1s the 
louchstone of sound contract 
inlel-pretation, the n prioli rejection of any 
"Defensive" tmaktmmd of ) 
external law I 
and public policy 
v$@ly.ad-&m.** sm anga. Thc 
e h e  by the parties to 
~~t is entitled to that 
QF isme coqembg past 
pac@ce is whether it can mod@ or 
o v e d e  dear cantmctual language to the 
con-. My owwe is that a long-standing 
a n d . ~ . ~ e p t e d  practice m y  prevail 
even over a "clearn and "express" 
p r m M ~ ~ ~ ~ i b  the agreement. There is also 
subdmtkd authority however, that p s t  
pmtke cannot trump an unambiguous 
I coamt tern. Employers have responded 
to the ehcroachments of past practice by 
s e e b g  mTiotls types of "zippar" clauses 
designed to make the. final written 
a g m a n q t  the exclusive source d 
employee mghts. Arbitrators are divided 
on the efficacy a£ this approach. 
dll:&ese past .practice cases are Pllghly 
fact-specif~. Generalizations are 
hazardous. But in r r y  vigw two 
fundamental principb are apposite. First, 
any contract, including a collective 
bargaining agreement, is subject to 
amendment by the parties to it. Second, 
for a practice to become sufficiently well 
established to be binding on the parties, it 
must meet the usual criteria of (1) clarity, 
(2) consistency, (3) longevity, and (4) 
mutual acceptability. Mutual acceptability 
is especially cru&l if the practice is 
claimed to have superseded a clear, 
express contract provision to the contrary 
If all the conditions are properly met, 
however, the practice should prevail. The 
parties are in control of their agreement 
and, absent statutory or contractual 
restrictions, they can fashion it or amend 
it just as well by deeds as by words. 
Arbitrators are simply following the 
parties' lead in acting accordingly 
Let me append a few words about the 
treatment of arbitration cases presenting 
issues of public policy or m e n d  lrtw 
generally Once a great debate raged 
Within the Academy over what an 
arbitrator should do when confronted 
with a conflict between the terms of a 
collective bargqining agreement and the 
requirements of external law I still believe 
that, theoretically, in the very rare case. 
where there is an irreconcilable clash 
between the contract and law (or 
"dominant public policyn), and the parties 
have not authorized the arbitrator, 
expressly or impliedly to take extend 
law into account, the arbitrator s h d d  
follow the contract and ignore the law . 
That is the parties' commission and the 
limit of the arbitrator's authority 
Nonetheless, as a practical matter, 
external law and public policy are now 
daily grist for the arbitration mills. This is 
especially true of civil rights statutes and 
the vital protections they provide against 
discrimination in employment on the 
grounds of race, sex, religion, age, 
disability, and the like. In the collective 
bargaining context, arbitrators are 
constantly applying anti-rhscrimhmtim 
clauses covering such categories. An 
arbitral award in these situations, where 
statutory rights are impicated, is of 
course not entitled to the same find a d  
binding effect that is customa~y in pure 
contract arbitrations. But mder the naw- 
famous footnote 2 1 in Alezuder u 
Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36 (19741, an 
arbitration decision in discrianination 
cases may be admitted in any subsequent 
court proceedmgs, and accorded "great 
weightn if certain conditions are met. 
Those include contractual provisions that 
"confarm substantidly with [the 
applicable statute] ," "procedural fairness," 
"adequacy of the record," and the "s~ecial . 
competence of particular arbitrators." 
All of us, advocates and arbitrators 
alike, have a professional respomibdity to 
ensure compliance with these Supreme 
Court standards in mixed contractual- 
statutory arbitrations. Employers. unions. 
and employees should not have to spend 
time and money wastefu1Zy To the extent 
- 
the law allows, arbitral awards ought to 
constitute a final disposition of the 
discrimination claims. In practice, much 
will depend on the losing party's 
assessment of its chance of securing a 
more favorable result in the courts. To 
promote finality, advocates in preparing 
their arguments and arbitrators in making 
their decisions must keep the Gardner- 
Denver factors in mind. I am going to take 
"procedural fairness" for granted. The 
others require deliberate attention. The 
anti-discrimination provisions of the 
contract may closely track the 
corresponding statute, but there are now 
extensive judicial glosses on all this 
legislation. The advocates should educate 
the arbitrator on the nuances of their 
particular case. In turn, the arbitrators 
should demonstrate their awareness of the 
applicable law and pertinent court 
interpretations. That will also serve to 
establish their "special competence." This 
could often require more than the two or 
three pages often specified for expedited 
arbitrations. 
Thus, in all the steps of a discrimination 
case, right through to the writing of any 
briefs and the decision, the advocates and 
the arbitrator should act "defensively." 
They ought to envisage a federal judge 
looking over their shoulder, scrutinizing 
their every move and testing it against the 
Gardner-Denver criteria. That should be 
enough to sharpen up everybody's skill at 
contract (or statute) reading! 
An analogous approach should be 
followed in the "public policy" cases. If a 
sexual harasser or a drug offender in a 
safety-sensitive job is involved, the 
advocates and in particular the arbitrator 
ought not turn a blind eye to the policy 
implications. Judicial review is a distinct 
possibility. The arbitrator would enhance 
the likelihood of the award's being 
sustained by forthrightly confronting the 
policy issues and explaining convincingly 
why the result reached is compatible with 
the public good. This is a long way from 
the almost totally autonomous, private 
domain of labor arbitration we once knew, 
but I think it accurately reflects the 
demands of the new age in which we 
find ourselves. 
Conclusion 
In interpreting and enforcing a labor 
agreement, the roles of arbitrators and 
courts are very different. The arbitrator is 
the parties' formally designated contract 
reader. Absent such abnormal circumstances 
as fraud, corruption, or an exceeding of 
authority, the arbitrator's award should be 
accepted by a reviewing court as if it were 
the parties' own stipulated and definitive 
interpretation of the agreement. The 
award of course is subject to the same 
kind of challenge on the grounds of 
illegality or violation of public policy as 
would have been the contract itself, had it 
come to the court directly without the 
intervention of arbitration. But that 
should also be the limit of judicial review. 
If the parties themselves could lawfully 
have done what the arbitrator has 
ordered, the award should be affirmed 
and enforced. 
In construing and applylng the 
collective agreement, the arbitrator will 
naturally employ a variety of traditional 
interpretive tools. I have focused on two 
controversial areas. First, I would reject 
the broad reach of the plain meaning rule. 
Regardless of whether contract language 
appears clear and unambiguous on its 
face, I would admit all credible evidence, 
within the constraints of procedural 
feasibility at a hearing, which goes to 
show the actual intent of the parties. 
Second, in spite of seemingly clear, 
unambiguous contract terms, I would 
accept proofs of well-established, 
mutually accepted practices that indicate a 
modification or amendment of those 
provisions. In so doing, I am most 
emphatically not trylng to elevate the 
arbitrator over the parties. My aim is to be 
faithful to the parties' manifest intent in 
the deepest, truest sense. 
Finally, as a person who treasures both 
tradition and autonomy, I can understand 
and sympathize with all those who lament 
the passing of a time when unions, 
employers, and arbitrators inhabited a 
self-made world of labor relations, for the 
most part untouched by public law and 
regulation. That day is gone. Yet we 
arbitrators have always operated within 
certain confines, namely, the parties' own 
contractual and bargaining frameworks. 
The difference is that the parties getlerall). 
had no resort from our "final and bindingv 
pronouncements, escept to dismiss us 
from their panels. Today a federal judge can 
bring us up short with a one-line order. 
We can adapt to this new order either 
grudgingly or gracefully. My hope is that 
we meet i t  as a challenge to the best that 
is within us. I am confident no member of 
this Academy lacks the capacity to handle 
most of the applicable statutes and other 
law and policy. Take, for example, the 
concept of "discrimination" under federal 
law. It is subtle and elusive. But it is not 
the Internal Revenue Code. We have been 
dealing with "discrimination" under union- 
employer contracts for decades. We can 
deal with it under public law, too. Thus, we 
should not flinch from having to change 
some of our customary ways. Change, after 
all, is the law of growth and survival, and 
we ignore that truth at our peril. 
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